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Note
Staged Cities: Mega-events, Slum Clearance,
and Global Capital
Solomon J. Greenet
Somehow, when the fair became part of the city, it did not work like the
fair.
-Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1991, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) held
their joint international conference in Bangkok, bringing over 10,000
delegates from more than 160 countries to the city. In the months before the
event, the Thai government forcibly removed over 2,000 slum dwellers
from the areas immediately surrounding the new $90 million Queen Sirikit
National Convention Center that hosted the conference.2 Hundreds of
shanties in informal settlements were destroyed and a huge metal wall was
erected to conceal the devastation left behind.3 Similarly, when the World
Bank and IMF held their conference in the Philippines in 1976, President
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process. I am also grateful to Ying Ying Li and the editors of the Yale Human Rights and
Development Law Journal for their enthusiasm, patience, and astute comments. As always, Ari
Biernoff has been an indispensable source of encouragement, inspiration, and last-minute
editing advice.
1. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 25 (1961).
2. See William Branigin, IMF Conference Brings 10,000 to Bangkok, WASH. POST, Oct. 16,
1991, at A7; Philip Shenon, Bangkok Journal: Where Beauty Queens Preen, No Eyesores, Please,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21,1991, at A4.
3. See Branigin, supra note 2.
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Marcos initiated a "beautification" campaign in which 400 families were
evicted from slums in Manila during the months preceding the event.
Despite the array of slum improvement programs financed by the World
Bank,5 Thailand and the Philippines both relied on shortsighted strategies
of forced removal in order to conceal the existence of slum dwellers and, in
doing so, protect national claims of "development."
In recent years, housing advocates and development scholars have
criticized large-scale urban economic development projects for their
adverse impacts on informal settlements. For example, in his World Bank
Discussion Paper, The Urban Environment and Population Relocation, Michael
Cernea suggests that "the frequency and magnitude of compulsory
displacement are likely to increase in the developing world as the trend
towards urbanization grows stronger." 6 In response to research conducted
by social scientists such as Cernea, the World Bank and other international
aid organizations have required that plans to address population
displacement be "part-and-parcel of policies for urban socioeconomic
development, rather than a mere side-effect not requiring explicit policy
and legal frameworks."7 Despite the increased attention to displacement
associated with development -projects, development scholars and
practitioners have paid little attention to the impacts of international events
on informal settlements in the developing world.8 The World Bank and
other international organizations, such as the International Olympic
4. See Shenon, supra note 2; ERHARD BERNER, LEGALIZING SQUATTERS, EXCLUDING THE
POOREST: URBAN LAND TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN THE PHILIPPINES 6 (1996) (Univ. of Bielefeld,
Sociology of Dev. Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 257, 1996), at
http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/sdrc/publications/working-papers/WP257.PDF
5. For an overview of the types of slum improvement programs advanced by the World
Bank, see Stephen K. Mayo & David J. Gross, Sites and Services - and Subsidies: The Economics of
Low-Cost Housing in Developing Countries, 1 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 301, 304-05 (1987);
Elizabeth Kubale Palmer & Carl V. Patton, Evolution of Third World Shelter Policies, in
SPONTANEOUS SHELTER: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES AND PROSPECTS 3, 11-15 (Carl V. Patton
ed., 1988). In general, the World Bank and other international aid agencies officially condemn
eviction and demolition as an ineffective, and ultimately economically inefficient, response to
urban slums. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, OPERATIONAL POLICY 4.12 ON INVOLUNTARY
RESETTLEMENT (2001) at http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/Institutional/Manuals/
OpManual.nsf/toc2/CA2D01A4DIBDF58085256B19008197F6?OpenDocument
6. MICHAEL M. CERNEA, THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT AND POPULATION RELOCATION iii
(World Bank Discussion Paper No. 152, 1993); see also Roli Asthana, Involuntary Resettlement:
Survey of International Experience, 31 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 1468, 1468 (1996).
7. CERNEA, supra note 6, at iii; see also ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, HANDBOOK ON
RESETTLEMENT: A GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE (1998); INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK,
INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT: OPERATIONAL POLICY AND BACKGROUND PAPER (1998) at
http://www.iadb.org/sds/doc/928eng.pdf; ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, GUIDELINES FOR AID AGENCIES ON INVOLUNTARY DISPLACEMENT AND
RESETTLEMENT IN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS (1992); WORLD BANK, supra note 5. Nonetheless,
critics have pointed out that official condemnation and resettlement guidelines have proven
insufficient to prevent widespread evictions associated with large development projects. See,
e.g., SCOTT LECKIE, WHEN PUSH COMES TO SHOVE: FORCED EVICTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29-
30 (1995) at http://www.cohre.org/lbframe.
8. But see U.N. CENTRE FOR HUMAN SETTLEMENTS, AN URBANIZING WORLD: GLOBAL
REPORT ON HUMAN SETTLEMENTS, 1996, at 245-246 (1996) [hereinafter UNCHS GLOBAL
REPORT].
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Committee and the World Tourism Council, have failed to look at what
happens behind the scenes when global conferences, sporting events, and
international expositions are held in cities in the developing world. In other
words, the international development community has failed critically to
examine what happens in the "backyard" of the mega-events they host or
participate in.
The evictions that occurred prior to the Word Bank and IMF
conferences epitomize a much broader trend. According to the 1996 Global
Report on Human Settlements prepared by the United Nations Centre for
Human Settlements (UNCHS), five of the top thirty-four recent examples
of massive evictions worldwide were related to mega-events. 9 The report
suggests that "beautification" projects immediately prior to international
events are one of the most common justifications for slum clearance
programs. 10
Since mega-events bring increased attention to host cities, they often
inspire municipal or national governments to improve the appearance of
the host city, usually on a very condensed timeframe. Under the logic of
event-oriented development, the visibility of poverty becomes paramount
in renewal schemes, and preparations often involve removing the poor
from high-profile areas surrounding event venues, without significant
attention to long-term solutions to slum problems. However, these
evictions often leave lasting impacts on the host city by radically
restructuring its social and economic geography. I describe these cities as
"staged cities" in order to highlight the tension between the mega-event as
a means of constructing an image of "development" and the actively
concealed landscapes of the urban poor.
This Note will examine in detail slum clearance programs aimed at
improving the appearance of high-profile areas immediately prior to two
international mega-events: the 1988 Summer Olympic Games in Seoul and
Santo Domingo's celebration of the 500th Anniversary of Columbus'
voyage to the Americas in 1992. While the evictions preceding each of these
mega-events have been well documented by the press" and advocates, 12
9. See id. at 246.
10. See id. at 245.
11. For examples of newspaper accounts of the evictions prior to the 1988 Summer
Olympics in Seoul, see David Bank, Seoul's Poor Could Find Plight Worsened After Olympics End,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 18, 1988, at A38; Peter Leyden, Olympic Fever Fizzles for These
South Koreans, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 11, 1988, at A19; Peter Maass, City, Nation on the
Upbeat Aim to Avoid Downside, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 1988, at El. For examples of coverage of
the 500th Anniversary in Santo Domingo, see Colin Harding, Rocky Course for Lighthouse in Eye
of Storm, INDEPENDENT, Oct. 7, 1992, at 12; Manuel Jimenez, They Threw a Party to Celebrate
Columbus, But Nobody Came, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 9, 1992, at 2; Kevin Rafferty, A Gloomy Monument
to Columbus, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1992, at Travel XI; Joseph B. Treaster, For Dominicans, Public
Projects But No Light, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1989, at A13; Cecile Holmes White, Columbus Day
Festivities: Lighthouse of Pride and Anger, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 11, 1992, at A22; Amy Wilenz,
Belaguer Builds a Lighthouse, NATION, May 21, 1990, at 702.
12. See, e.g., Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (ACHR), Evictions in Seoul, South Korea, 1
ENV'T & URBANIZATION 89, 92-93 (1989) [hereinafter ACHR]; Hyung-Hook Kim, South Korea:
Experiences of Eviction in Seoul, in EvICTIONS AND THE RIGHT TO HOUSING 199, 223-231 (Antonio
Azuela et al. eds., 1998); Edmundo Morel & Manuel Mejia, The Dominican Republic: Urban
20031
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these accounts fail to compare the two case studies or analyze more
generally the impacts of mega-events on low-income and squatter
communities in the developing world.13 Although other examples of mega-
events abound, 4 these two case studies most dramatically illustrate the
tension between development goals and international events. Together, the
"beautification" programs associated with these events precipitated the
eviction of an estimated 900,000 low-income people.' 5
Part II will describe the growing importance of mega-events as an
urban redevelopment strategy in a global economic system in which cities
must vigorously compete with each other to attract increasingly mobile
capital. Parts III and IV will describe the political and economic contexts in
which the Summer Olympics in Seoul and the 500th Anniversary in Santo
Domingo were developed and the impacts that these mega-events had on
urban slum dwellers. In Part V, common themes from these two case
studies will be examined. Finally, Part VI will propose alternatives to slum
clearance and suggest how mega-events can function to improve the
conditions of poor people in host cities, rather than simply - and
violently -banishing them from sight.
II. BIG KAHUNA CAPITALISM:
MEGA-EVENTS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Mega-events, also referred to as "hallmark" or "landmark" events, are
large-scale events intended to renew investment in host cities, usually in
the tourism sector, by projecting a positive image of the city. 16 Mega-events
can be distinguished from smaller events-such as routine conferences,
celebrations, or sporting events-by the tremendous amount of resources
Renewal and Evictions in Santo Domingo, in EVICTIONS AND THE RIGHT TO HOUSING 83, 98
(Antonio Azuela et al. eds., 1998).
13. For the purposes of this Note, South Korea is treated as a "developing country"
despite its admission to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) in 1996. By most accounts, South Korea was still considered a developing country
during the 1988 Olympic Games, with an average yearly per-capita income of $3000. See, e.g.,
Fred Hiatt, U.S. Visitors Can't Say Enough About Koreans' Hospitality, WASH. POST, Sept. 21,
1988, at Dll. In fact, the country's emergence as a developed nation is often attributed, in part,
to its selection as an Olympic host city. See, e.g:, Trip Gabriel, China Strains for Olympic Glory,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1998, § 6 (Magazine), at 30; Fred Hiatt, Seoul: Where Skyscrapers, Squid Mix,
WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1987, at A29; Lena H. Sun, Threat to '88 Olympics Upsets S. Koreans, WASH
POST, June 26,1987, at Al.
14. See, e.g., Poona Antaseeda, Beggars Face Crackdown as Asiad Nears, BANGKOK POST,
Nov. 25, 1998, at 4 (describing police sweeps of panhandlers and squatters in Bangkok prior to
the 1998 Asian Games); Fred Edwards, Cute Panda Covers Up Beijing's Vicious Tiger, TORONTO
STAR, Sept. 6, 1990, at A23 (describing slum clearance in Beijing prior to the 1990 Asian
Games).
15. UNCHS GLOBAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 246.
16. See J. R. Brent Ritchie, Assessing the Impact of Hallmark Events: Conceptual and Research
Issues, 23 J. TRAVEL RES. 2, 2 (1984). C.f. Colin Michael Hall, Hallmark Tourist Events: Analysis,
Definition, Methodology and Review, in THE PLANNING AND EVALUATION OF HALLMARK EVENTS
3,4 (Geoffrey Syme et al. eds., 1989) (expanding the definition of "hallmark events" to include
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that go into their implementation and the physical legacies for host cities.17
During preparations for a mega-event, the line between short-term events
and ongoing urban development is blurred: hotels, stadiums,
entertainment complexes, urban parks, and civic monuments are
constructed to accommodate the event itself but often are connected with a
broader urban revitalization agenda. Frequently, in the years prior to a
mega-event, the host city will witness unprecedented rates of construction
activity as the city gears up for a massive influx of visitors and heightened
international attention.18
British sociologist Maurice Roche has laid out the critical characteristics
that define mega-events and guide mega-event research:
Mega-events (large scale leisure and tourism events such as
Olympic Games and World Fairs) are short-term events with
long-term consequences for the cities that stage them. They are
associated with the creation of infrastructure and event facilities
often carrying long-term debts and always requiring long-term
use programming. In addition, if successful, they project a new (or
renewed) and perhaps persistent and positive image and identity
for the host city through national and international media,
particularly TV, coverage. This is usually assumed to have long-
term positive consequences in terms of tourism, industrial
relocation, and inward investments. 9
Research on mega-events has focused on the role and impact of mega-
events within Western, post-industrial cities. 20  Mega-events are
increasingly used as a means of revitalizing depressed post-industrial city
centers. In the American context, local governments adopted mega-events
as one of the main "entrepreneurial policies for economic development"
after federal aid was cut in the 1980s. 21 Civic leaders in host cities offer
multiple justifications for public investments in mega-events. For example,
event organizers often articulate a desire to restore "self-confidence,"
17. See Maurice Roche, Mega-Events and Urban Policy, 21 ANNALS OF TOURISM RES. 1, 1-2
(1994).
18. See, e.g., Pete Yoo, Games Catalyst for Seoul Building Boom, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 16,
1989, at 59 (describing the role that the Games played in stimulating double-digit growth in
South Korea's construction sector in 1988); MARIA ELENA PORTORREAL DE ALONSO, U.S. &
FOREIGN COMMERCIAL SERVICE, FISCAL YEAR 1994 COUNTRY MARKETING PLAN FOR THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND THE CARIBBEAN REGION, June 1993, LEXIS Country Reports,
Dominican Republic (describing double-digit growth in the Dominican Republic's
construction sector in 1991-1992, largely due to government projects associated with the 500th
Anniversary celebration).
19. See Roche, supra note 17, at 1-2.
20. See, e.g., Colin Michael Hall, The Effects of Hallmark Events on Cities, 26 J. TRAVEL RES.
44 (1987); John A. Hannigan, The Postnodern City: A New Urbanization?, 43 CURRENT SOc. 155,
194-95 (1995); Harry Hiller, The Urban Transformation of a Landmark Event: The 1988 Calgary
Winter Olympics, 26 URB. AFF. Q. 118 (1990); Roche, supra note 17.
21. See Greg Andranovich et al., Olympic Cities: Lessons Learned front Mega-Event Politics,
23 J. URB. AFF. 113,113-14 (2001).
20031
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"dynamism," and "civic pride" among residents of the host city.2 2 Harry
Hiller describes the role that the Calgary Olympics played in promoting
"spirit-building civic interaction" through "pin-trading, pancake
breakfasts, and people watching," as well as creating an overall "party
spirit" in the city.23 More often, researchers focus on the political economy
of mega-events and their role in generating both revenue and international
prestige for host cities. On a national level, mega-events are typically part
of a larger program to develop tourism and international investments. 24 On
a municipal level, mega-events can play an important role in recasting
downtown areas as sites for leisure activities and consumption, typically
through the development of sports venues, hotels, and tourist attractions.25
Perhaps the most compelling explanations for the increasing
popularity of mega-events situate them within the context of inter-city
competition for capital in a postmodern, global marketplace.26 The
international attention that mega-events attract can help emerging global
cities define or "re-image" themselves to both potential investors and
tourists. Mega-events play a critical role in enabling local elites to offer "a
coherent interpretation of a city's 'intentions' and of its economic and
political environment-in other words, its 'image."' 27 David Harvey
describes the pressures on cities to undergo such an imaging process:
Cities and places now, it seems, take much more care to create a
positive and high quality image of place ... [This process] is
understandable, given the grim history of deindustrialization and
restructuring that left most major cities in the advanced capitalist
world with few options except to compete with each other, mainly
as financial, consumption, and entertainment centres. Imaging a
city through the organization of spectacular urban spaces became
a means to attract capital and people (of the right sort) in a period
(since 1973) of intensified inter-urban competition and urban
entrepreneurialism." 28
In the early 1990s, U.S. News and World Report remarked on the
explosive popularity of mega-events and large-scale spectacle-oriented
development projects as a means of attracting global capital, describing this
trend as the "Big Kahuna approach" to urban development: "building big
projects and hoping that, like some Hawaiian witch doctor, they'll
magically bring cash and prestige."29 Similarly, Roche suggests that mega-
22. See Roche, supra note 17, at 9.
23. Hiller, supra note 20, at 126, 128.
24. See Roche, supra note 17, at 8-9.
25. See Hannigan, supra note 20, at 194-95.
26. See, e.g., Andranovich, supra note 21, at 113-15.
27. Dennis Judd & Michael Parkinson, Urban Leadership and Regeneration, in LEADERSHIP
AND URBAN REGENERATION 13,22 (Dennis Judd & Michael Parkinson eds., 1990).
28. DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY 92 (1994).
29. Matthew Cooper et al., If You Build It...They Might Not Come, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., June 24, 1991, at 26.
[Vol. 6
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events "are being produced by cities in the throes of transformation and in
various sorts of crisis," and play an important role in assisting host cities
"to renew their image, to restructure and reposition themselves as centers
of capital and labor, production, and exchange in the national and global
economy, and generally to 'modernize."' 30 As Roche observes, mega-events
have become increasingly popular tools for responding to the urban crises
in the face of which many municipal governments feel they lack "realistic
alternatives." 31
Despite the renewed attention by academics to the efficacy of mega-
events as a redevelopment tool, the existing literature on mega-events is
largely limited to First World urban centers. Mega-events have also played
an increasingly prominent role in the developing world, however, and in
recent years several developing countries have aggressively pursued bids
to host international sporting events, such as the Olympic Games.32 Crucial
differences between hosting mega-events in the developed and developing
world have not yet been thoroughly evaluated.33
While the literature on mega-events in the developed world often
focuses on the trend towards revitalizing post-industrial urban centers
through "consumption-based" economic development,34 mega-events in
the developing world are often motivated, at least in part, by a desire to
demonstrate that the host county embraces international legal norms.35 In
addition to recasting the image of the host city as a hospitable location for
tourism and leisure activities through physical improvements, mega-events
in the developing world can help the host country assure tourists and
potential investors that it respects human rights and the rule of law. 36 The
close connection between the Olympics and the promotion of the rule of
30. Roche, supra note 17, at 13.
31. Id. at 9.
32. See Victor A. Matheson & Robert A. Baade, Mega-Sporting Events in Developing
Nations: Playing the Way to Prosperity? 1-3 (2002) (unpublished manuscript at
http://www.williams.edu/Economics/neudc/papers/matheson.pdf) (discussing how
"developing nations have increasingly demanded the right to host the [Olympic] Games" and
pointing out that the finalists for the 2004 and 2008 Summer Games included Cape Town,
Buenos Aires, and Istanbul, with Beijing "ultimately winning" the bid for the 2008 Games).
33. Matheson and Baade have begun to assess the advantages and disadvantages of
hosting mega-events in developing countries in an unpublished paper. See id.
34. See, e.g., Andranovich, supra note 21, at 115-17.
35. See infra Part V.E.; see also Kyong Whan Ahn, The Influence of American
Constitutionalism on South Korea, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 83(1997) (noting that "[h]osting the 1988
Summer Olympics may have provided a turning point in Korea's attitude toward the
international legal community").
36. For an overview of the politics of international sporting events and the longstanding
relationship between the Olympic Games and human rights promotion, see Paul Mastrocola,
The Lord of the Rings: The Role of Olympic Site Selection as a Weapon Against Human Rights
Abuses: China's Bid for the 2000 Olympics, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 141, 145-46, 152-59 (1995);
Thomas R. Dominicyk, The New Melting Pot: As American Attitudes Toward Foreigners Continue
to Decline, Athletes Are Welcomed with Open Arms, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 165, 194-201
(1988). James Nafziger lists "diplomatic recognition or nonrecognition" and the "promotion of
human rights or economic development" as among the principal reasons for government
support of sporting competitions. James A.R. Nafziger, International Sports Law: A Replay of
Characteristics and Trends, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 489, 496 (1992); see also JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER,
INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 71, 80-96 (1988).
20031
7
Greene: Staged Cities: Mega-events, Slum Clearance, and Global Capital
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2003
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
law dates back at least to the 1964 Olympics in Tokyo, when the Japanese
government launched a massive five-year long campaign to "instill a
respect and basic compliance towards the rule of law" among the Japanese
citizenry prior to the Games. 37 By selecting a country to host their mega-
event, international institutions such as the World Bank or the International
Olympic Committee (IOC) seemingly place their stamp of approval on the
host country's legal and political institutions.38
The recent controversy surrounding China's bid for the 2008 Summer
Olympics powerfully demonstrates the ideological potency of international
mega-events. It is widely recognized that China's bid for the 2000 Games,
initiated soon after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, failed due to
the nation's dismal human rights record, whereas its successful bid for the
2008 Games reflected the IOC's hopes that the Games would act as a
catalyst for legal reform and serve as a constraint on state abuses.39 As
James Lilley, the U.S. Ambassador to Seoul during the 1988 Olympics,
remarked during China's bid, "Just as Chinese membership in the WTO
will oblige Beijing to play by accepted international rules, the Olympics
should keep hard-liners in the regime in check .... [The Olympics] should
afford the Chinese people an opportunity to broaden their limited political
and economic freedoms."40 The use of mega-events as a means of
showcasing political stability and legal maturity in developing countries
promises to intensify as development scholars increasingly emphasize the
links between economic development and strong legal institutions and as
international aid organizations condition assistance on legal reforms.41
37. See Chan Jin Kim, Korean Attitudes Towards Law, 10 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 1, 34 (2000).
38. See, e.g., Tracy Dahlby, Award of 1988 Olympics Boosts S. Korea's Effort for Political
Security, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1981, at H2 (describing how "winning the Olympic laurels"
marked an "important step" in then President Chun Doo Hwan's "efforts to restore political
stability to South Korea and revive international confidence in its economy"); Nicholas D.
Kristof, Games Offering China a Chance to Polish Image, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1990, at 1
(describing the 1990 Asian Games as an opportunity for China to "win back international
respect" and "rejoin the international community" after the violent crackdown of June 1989).
39. See, e.g., Steven Harris, Now the World Accepts Us, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, July 16,
2001, at 7; Melinda Liu, All That Glitters...China's PR Blitz May Win It the 2008 Games, But Even
the Sunniest Face Can't Entirely Obscure a Darker Reality, NEWSWEEK, July 16, 2001, at 30.
40. James R. Lilley, Beijing's Risky New Game, NEWSWEEK, July 16, 2001, at 32.
41. Numerous law and development scholars have observed that international
investment will not thrive where rule of law institutions remain weak. See, e.g., Thomas
Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 1998, at 95, 97 ("Without the rule
of law, major economic institutions such as corporations, banks, and labor unions would not
function, and the government's many involvements in the economy...would be unfair,
inefficient, and opaque."); THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 129-131
(1999) (identifying the rule of law as a necessary component of a successful modern economy);
William B. T. Mock, An Interdisciplinary Introduction to Legal Transparency: A Tool for Rational
Development, 18 DICK. J. INT'L L. 293, 304 (2000) (arguing that the rule of law lowers transaction
costs associated with international business and investment). The connection between
functioning legal institutions and sustained economic development underpins the legal
reform programs funded by international aid organizations such as USAID and the World
Bank. See Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and
Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1, 17-18 (1989); Jason Gottlieb, Launching the Phnom Penh Stock
Exchange: Toward a Legal Framework for Launching a Stock Exchange in an Underdeveloped Country,
14 COLUM. I. ASIAN L. 235, 271 (2000); Jacques do I.ile; IPy Americna,,?: United Stae Lega
[Vol. 6
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Perhaps more surprising than the lack of scholarship on the role of
mega-events in developing countries is the dearth of research on the
impact of event-related development on low-income communities, either in
wealthy or developing countries. Few researchers have asked critical
questions about the ways in which mega-events impact the lives of the
most economically and socially marginalized populations in host cities.42
Instead, focus has been on narrow cost-benefit analysis to determine the
worthiness of mega-event investments.43 If low-income communities are
acknowledged at all in mega-event research, they are usually treated
uncritically, as beneficiaries of "trickle-down" economics.Y Even assuming
that mega-events are, in fact, profitable for host cities (an assumption that
is highly contested),45 disparities among urban populations and the
marginalization of low-income communities in the city's social and
economic landscape are often exacerbated by mega-events, as the following
case studies illustrate.
III. SEOUL CASE STUDY
A. The Urban Context
In the second half of the twentieth century, Seoul rapidly grew to
become one of the most densely populated cities in the world. 46 Between
1960 and 1983, the proportion of South Korea's population living in cities
grew from 36 to 72%. 4 7 During this period, South Korea developed from a
relatively poor nation with an agrarian base to a leading global industrial
Assistance, American Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20
U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 179, 217 (1999).
42. Examples of studies that have considered the impacts of individual mega-events on
low-income populations in developed countries include CHARLES RUTHHEISER, IMAGINEERING
ATLANTA: THE POLITICS OF PLACE IN THE CITY OF DREAMS 213, 263-74, 279-82 (1996); Kris Olds,
Mass Evictions in Vancouver: The Human Toll of Expo '86, 6 CAN. HOUSING 49 (1989) [hereinafter
Olds, Mass Evictions]; Kris Olds, Urban Mega-Events, Evictions and Housing Rights: The Canadian
Case, 1 CURRENT ISSUES TOURISM 2, (1998) [hereinafter Olds, Urban Mega-Events]; Solomon J.
Greene, Olympia Was Not A City: Poverty, Planning, and the Restructuring of Urban Space
in Olympic Atlanta (1996) (unpublished A.B. thesis, Stanford University) (on file with author).
43. See Colin Michael Hall, Hallmark Events and the Planning Process, in THE PLANNING
AND EVALUATION OF HALLMARK EVENTS supra note 16, at 20, 22-26 (explaining that "the little
analysis that has been undertaken [on mega-events] has tended to focus on the economic
impacts of such events" and describing several studies utilizing misleading cost-benefit
analyses).
44. See Brent Ritchie & Michael Hall, Mega Events and Human Rights, in PROCEEDINGS OF
SPORT AND HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE 102, 113 (Tracy Taylor ed., 1999), at
http://www.hrca.org.au/HOW%20YOU%20PLAY%20THE%20GAME%20fin.pdf; Calvin
Jones, A Level Playing Field? Sports Stadium Infrastructure and Urban Development in the United
Kingdom, 33 ENV'T & PLAN. A, 845, 845 (2001).
45. For accounts critical of the economics of mega-events, see Robert Baade & Victor
Mattheson, Sports Facilities and Development: High Octane? Grading the Impact of the Daytona 500,
10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 401 (2000); Jan Borowy, Big Bucks, Bad Sports: Olympics and the Labour
Movement, OUR TIMES, Dec. 1989, at 19; Cooper, supra note 29, at 26; Hannigan, supra note 20.
46. See Kwang-Joong Kim, New Form, Classic Problem: Pseudo-Public Residential
Redevelopment in Seoul, 24 BUILT ENV'T 235, 235, 239 (1998).
47. See ACHR, supra note 12.
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power. 48 Seoul's position as South Korea's primary city was reinforced by
this economic shift, and, by the 1980s, one third of national GDP was
generated by enterprises located in Seoul.49 The city's population swelled
from 2.5 million in 1962 to 10 million in 1988, largely due to rural-urban
migration, and its share of the country's total population grew from 9.8%
in 1960 to 22.3% in 1980.50 By 1988, when the city hosted the Summer
Olympics, planners in Seoul estimated that only 15% of the city's
population had been born in the city.51
Rapid in-migration combined with a lack of developable land led to a
persistent housing shortage in Seoul, despite efforts to expand and
modernize the city's housing supply.52 Since the late 1960s, much of the city
has been rebuilt and the traditional housing stock of tile-roofed wooden
structures has largely been replaced by modern high-rise developments. 53
The country's rapidly expanding economy has driven up land prices and
created tremendous pressures to redevelop existing residential areas, many
of which were already densely populated. Between 1960 and 1980, 117 km2
of land was redeveloped, representing about one-fifth of the total area of
the center city. 54
Widespread evictions accompanied Seoul's explosive growth and
frenetic urban development. Several factors contributed to evictions,
including market pressures, lack of government programs to replace low-
cost housing, and the absence of even the most basic tenant rights.5 5 Most
importantly, strong government control over squatter developments,
typically built on public land with no public financing, enabled massive
government-sponsored evictions.5 6 Seoul's forced eviction program during
the 1980s is estimated to be one of the largest government-sponsored
eviction programs of any city in the world in recent decades.57
Large-scale evictions began in 1966, when the Seoul government
undertook its first major slum clearance project, aimed at replacing 136,000
squatter units with 90,000 public housing units.58 Four years later, over 50%
of the squatter settlements demolished under this program had been
removed, but less than 17% of the planned public housing units had been
built.59 Relocated households were forced to fend for themselves in
48. See id. at 89
49. See id.
50. William C. Baer & Chamun Koo, Housing Turnover in Developing Nations: The Case of
Seoul, 13 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 104, 109 (1994).
51. Daniel Sneider, Seoul: All Dressed Up and Raring to Go, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Sept.
2,1988, at 16.
52. See Baer & Koo, supra note 50, at 109.
53. See ACHR, supra note 12, at 89.
54. Id. at 91.
55. See id. at 89-90.
56. See id. at 90.
57. See id. at 89; Scott Leckie, When Push Cones to Shove: Eviction's No Fiction, WHOLE
EARTH REV., Sept. 22, 1991, at 88, 89; UNCHS GLOBAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 245.
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outlying areas, far away from jobs and social networks. 60
Throughout the 1970s, the municipal government continued to clear
slums through its Residential Redevelopment Program. Under this
program, the City was supposed to designate certain squatter areas as
Substandard Housing Redevelopment Districts (SHR districts), rezone the
designated land for residential use, expedite code approvals, and then sell
the land to occupants at far below market price.61 However, the SHR
program lacked adequate funding, improvements proceeded slowly, and
squatter settlements continued to proliferate. By 1980, some two million
people lived in illegal housing, usually built on land unsuitable for
development. According to the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights
(ACHR), displaced households deliberately chose to occupy undesirable
sites in order to avoid future evictions.62
B. The 1988 Summer Olympics
In 1981, the IOC announced that South Korea had been successful in its
bid to host the 1988 Summer Olympic Games. Although the South Korean
government had declared an end to forceful eviction programs in 1980, the
successful bid for the Olympics sparked renewed interest in
redevelopment projects. 63 In addition to the real estate pressures already
threatening informal settlements in Seoul, the preparation for the Olympics
created a heightened demand for land to construct sports venues, tourist
facilities, and accommodations for athletes, the press, and over 250,000
visitors. The Olympics also transformed the spatial pattern of evictions by
shifting the city's focus to providing land for venues and removing
unsightly slums from high profile areas, such as along the route of the
Olympic torch.64
Seoul spent approximately $3 billion on new facilities and urban
improvements in preparation for the Olympics. 65 In addition to sports
stadiums, the City extended subway lines, constructed new highways and
a new airport terminal, refurbished monuments and historic buildings, and
developed a 122-building apartment complex to house athletes, journalists,
and sports officials. 66 In 1983, the government designated 227 areas to be
redeveloped by 1990.67 During the five years preceding the Games, 48,000
buildings, housing 720,000 people, were destroyed for redevelopment. 68
Most of the demolished structures were single-story houses built with
60. See id. at 90-91.
61. Kim, supra note 46, at 239.
62. ACHR, supra note 12, at 90.
63. Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (ACHR), NGO Profile: Asian Coalition for Housing
Rights, 5 ENV'T & URBANIZATION, 153, 155 (1993) [hereinafter ACHR, NGO Profile].
64. See ACHR, supra note 12, at 92.
65. Fred Hiatt, Dog Meat Out, Flowers In: Seoul Looks to Games, WASH. POsT, Aug. 18, 1988,
at A33.
66. Maass, supra note 11.
67. Leyden, supra note 11.
68. Bank, supra note 11.
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virtually no public investment; they were replaced with high-rise public
housing projects widely criticized for disrupting the vitality and texture of
the urban environment.69 Ninety percent of the 720,000 evictees did not
receive replacement housing within the redevelopment site.70
In the 1980s, Seoul adopted a "joint development" or "partnership
renewal" model of slum improvement.71 Responding to strong opposition
from residents to previous evictions, this new model created a
development "cooperative" between property owners and construction
companies to redevelop land targeted for renewal. The joint development
model gave homeowners a voluntary role in devising and implementing
redevelopment plans and guaranteed displaced homeowners a new
apartment in rebuilt developments. 72 The role of the City was reduced to
that of a controller with minimal financial commitments.73 Within Seoul's
flourishing housing market, this privatization approach was successful in
creating much-needed housing for a burgeoning middle-class population
but failed to create affordable housing for lower-income tenants.74
Although tenants accounted for a majority of the households in SHR
districts, the joint development program did not recognize the interest of
tenants and squatters in the redevelopment process.75 Excluded from the
partnership between property owners and developers, tenants were
displaced from redevelopment sites and were not provided with any
guarantees of return. Relocation subsidies, when provided, were
insufficient to provide temporary housing even during the construction
period.76 Due to escalating land costs and rampant exploitation by real
estate speculators, even homeowners often could not afford to move back
into redeveloped units. Only an estimated 10% of homeowners were able
to afford to return to the rebuilt housing in the SHR districts.77 According
to Korean urban planner Kwang-Joong Kim, "Seoul's new housing
produced by the SHR programme was in essence a commodity that was
too remote for the displaced people to reach." 78
The process of redevelopment prior to the Olympics pushed low-
income residents farther and farther away from the center city, often
through multiple evictions in the course of only one or two years. For
example, the neighborhood of Mok Dong was created when six squatter
communities were evicted from the center city in the 1960s and moved to
Mok Dong, which at the time was farmland. The population of Mok Dong
increased in the 1970s as additional families evicted from other
redevelopment sites moved in. By the early 1980s, Mok Dong housed
69. See Kim, supra note 46, at 242-49.
70. ACHR, supra note 12, at 91.
71. See Kim, supra note 46, at 241.
72. See ACHR, supra note 12, at 91.
73. Kim, supra note 46, at 241.
74. See Bank, supra note 11; Kim, supra note 46, at 246.
75. See Kim, supra note 46, at 246.
76. Id.
77. See Bank, supra note 11; Kim, supra note 46, at 246.
78. Kim, supra note 46, at 249.
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around 7800 families, including 2600 homeowners and 5200 renters.79
Finally, in 1984, Mok Dong itself became targeted as a redevelopment site
and 3200 houses were demolished. 80 Although the public authority
overseeing the project generated tremendous profits from the sale of the
23,000 apartments on the site, no compensation was provided to the
tenants who were evicted, and the homeowners who had lived on the site
prior to redevelopment could not afford to purchase the rebuilt units. 81
Instead, profits generated from redevelopment projects such as Mok Dong
were used to finance the construction of Olympic facilities. 82
Like Mok Dong, the Sang Kye Dong neighborhood was originally
created to re-house squatters evicted from other redevelopment sites in the
1960s. With the development of a subway system as part of the
preparations for the Olympic Games, however, the 1100 households in
Sang Kye Dong once again became victims of redevelopment.83 Residents
of Sang Kye Dong resisted evictions but were subjected to a series of
violent attacks by police and several hundred men hired by construction
companies to intimidate residents.84 The Asian Coalition for Housing
Rights estimated that, between June 1986 and April 1987 residents of Sang
Kye Dong were attacked 18 times.85 Finally, on April 14, 1987, just over a
year before the Olympic Games, 3500 movers and riot police forcibly
removed the remaining residents of Sang Kye Dong from their homes.86
The Sang Kye Dong residents were temporarily relocated to a lot
outside the Roman Catholic Myongdong Cathedral in downtown Seoul,
then joined other evictees on plot of land purchased collectively in Puchon,
a suburb of Seoul. Using carefully collected building materials, such as
salvaged lumber, carpets, and blankets, they constructed makeshift
residences on the plot in Puchon. 87 Within days, however, city crews tore
down the modest homes, since, as it turned out, the plot in Puchon was
immediately adjacent to the path of the Olympic torch. One evictee in
Puchon criticized the Olympics movement for failing to meet its lofty goals
of promoting human betterment: "even though [the Olympics Movement]
is in the spirit of peace, in Korea [it] has been more oppressive than
anything else. It has taken away the rights of the poor." 88
The imbalances created by the Olympics extend beyond squatter
evictions. For example, when the government built new roads connecting
the international airport to Olympic venues, it failed to provide sidewalks,
despite the fact that the vast majority of Seoul residents did not own cars. 89
79. ACHR, supra note 12, at 91.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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Judge Krishna Iyer, a former justice of India's Supreme Court and a
participant in Habitat International Coalition's fact-finding mission to
Seoul, said that the city's obsession with "beautification" for the Olympics
had accelerated Korea's "neurotic development" by promoting rapid
economic growth while leaving behind the urban poor.90
IV. SANTO DOMINGO CASE STUDY
A. The Urban Context
Like Seoul, Santo Domingo was a site of rapid population growth and
urban primacy in the second half of the twentieth century. The proportion
of the Dominican Republic's population living in cities increased from
23.8% in 1950 to 52% in 1981.91 Santo Domingo, the nation's capital,
disproportionately absorbed the Dominican Republic's growing urban
population. By 1981, Santo Domingo contained 30% of the national
population and 50% of the nation's urban population.92 The city's economic
importance also grew exponentially; by the 1980s, between 70 and 90% of
the nation's industry, commerce, services and administration were located
in Santo Domingo.93
During this period of rapid growth, Santo Domingo lacked a coherent
urban development plan and the city grew in a "helter-skelter" manner,
largely driven by land speculation. 94 Economic growth in the Dominican
Republic during the import substitution period in the 1960s and 1970s led
to the creation of a new urban middle class and increased demand for
luxury housing in the capital city.95 This demand drove up land prices in
Santo Domingo, and new exclusive residential neighborhoods emerged in
the 1970s. At the same time, conglomerations of slum dwellings and
squatter settlements expanded north of downtown and east of the Ozama
River, which was later to become the site of the Columbus Lighthouse
constructed for the 500th Anniversary celebration. 96 By the 1980s, about
70% of the population of Santo Domingo lived in the "informal sector" of
working-class barrios and poor shantytowns. 97 This sector produced 85%
of the housing in the city, typically built on state-owned, under-serviced
land and constructed using household savings, with little or no public
investment.98
In the late 1980s, President Balaguer sought to restructure the
Dominican Republic's national economy towards increasing dependence
90. Bank, supra note 11 (quoting Krishna Iyer).




95. Alejandro Portes et al., Urbanization in the Caribbean Basin: Social Change During the
Years of Crisis, 29 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 3, 21 (1994).
96. Id.
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on tourism and manufacturing in free-trade zones.99 The tourism sector in
the country grew to become the country's largest foreign exchange earner
in the 1980s, yielding $570 million in 1988, almost double the combined
income from the country's three traditional mainstays: sugar, coffee, and
cocoa.100 By 1991, tourism was generating $800 million in revenue. 01
In order to promote tourism, Balaguer's government adopted a
massive public works program in the in the late 1980s.10 2 In the first
eighteen months after Balaguer returned to office in 1986, $250 million was
spent on public works projects, including roads, bridges, schools, housing,
libraries, museums, theaters, parks, and sports complexes 0 3 This amount
was 34% more than had been spent in the previous eight years.1' 4 By 1988,
the state's expenditures on massive public works and hotel construction far
surpassed earnings in tourism and the country was saddled with a foreign
debt of $3.5 billion, due in part to its excessive expenditures on large
development projects. 105
With the proliferation of development projects, the pace and scale of
evictions exploded in the late 1980s. In Santo Domingo, entire
neighborhoods were devastated by the central government's push for
tourism-related development. 106 Despite the critical importance of informal
housing in the development of the city, squatters were denied legal
recognition and were excluded from negotiations and planning.10 7 While
the state had previously adopted a permissive attitude toward squatter
development on public land, squatters faced eviction in the late 1980s by
state agencies that cited illegality as grounds for removal.108 Entire
neighborhoods were relocated, either voluntarily or under compulsion, to
new state-owned lands farther away from the urban center and lacking in
basic services.109 In these new outlying areas, low-income households
started the informal urbanization process all over again.
B. 500th Anniversary of the Columbus Voyage
At the center of President Balaguer's urban development strategy was
the promotion of Santo Domingo's tourism potential through the
celebration of the 500th Anniversary of Columbus' voyage to the Americas
in October 1992. The 500th Anniversary added a sense of urgency to the
existing construction program, driving up costs and magnifying the
99. Marie Michael, The Dominican Republic: Political Economic History and Growth,
DOLLARS & SENSE, Mar. 1, 2001, at 34.
100. Joseph Treaster, Santo Domingo Journal: At 80, Master Builder is Busy (and Boastful),
N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 7, 1988, at A4.
101. Rafferty, supra note 11, at XI.
102. Morel and Mejia, supra note 12, at 91-92.
103. Treaster, supra note 100, at A4.
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. See Morel & Mejia, supra note 12, at 95-96.
107. See id. at 103.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 95.
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disruption associated with infrastructure projects. During the years
preceding the celebration, peripheral settlements burgeoned as people
were driven from the more visible central districts." 0 Although there was
no reliable official registry of displaced families, it is estimated that
between 1986 and 1992 approximately 30,000 families (or 180,000 people)
were evicted from areas undergoing urban renewal in Santo Domingo."'
The majority of families evicted were not offered resettlement.11 2 Many
families did not have proper homes for three or four years and were
constantly shuffled from one part of the city to another.113
By 1990, the state had run out of money and inflation had reached the
triple digit level, forcing the pace of construction to slow.1 1 4 However,
despite the lack of funds for new development, evictions continued to
occur. In 1991, the state sent the army into several barrios and announced
immediate evacuation. The state justified this action as a response to the
"need to open up space for business and tourist investment, to beautify the
city for the fifth centenary, and to remove obstacles in the path of urban
schemes (in temporary suspension) for which it was hoped that there
would soon be more public funding."1 15 While Balaguer justified slum
clearance and his costly public works program as means of creating a
"dignified atmosphere" for the 500th Anniversary, critics claimed that he
was more concerned with building monuments to himself than with
improving the welfare of the country. 116
Estimates of the number of barrio dwellers evicted during the period of
heightened redevelopment prior to the 500th Anniversary vary in news
reports and academic research." 7 It is difficult to determine the total impact
of the mega-event on slum clearance due to a lack of official documentation
and because evictions prior to the event occurred within the context of
broader urban renewal. However, the consequences of the mega-event are
easy to pinpoint in areas slated for redevelopment explicitly in preparation
for the celebrations, such as the Barrio Maquiteria neighborhood adjacent
to the Columbus Lighthouse.
At a cost of $100 million, Balaguer saw the construction of a massive
lighthouse, allegedly housing Columbus' remains, as the centerpiece of the
500th Anniversary celebrations. Critics have described the lighthouse,
110. See id. at 98.
111. See id. at 84-85.
112. See id. at 85; United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(UNCESCR), Concluding Observations on Dominican Republic, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1994/15 (1994)
available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/esc/DOMINICA.htm [hereinafter UNCESCR].
113. Morel & Mejia, supra note 12, at 85.
114. Id. at 98.
115. Id. at 100.
116. Treaster, supra note 100.
117. See, e.g., UNCESCR, supra note 112 (estimating that 30,000 households were
displaced); JORGE HARDOY & DAVID SATFERTHWAITE, SQUATTER CITIZEN: LIFE IN THE THIRD
WORLD 42 (1989) (100,000 individuals); Morel & Mejia, supra note 12, at 84 (30,000
households); UNCHS GLOBAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 246 (180,000 individuals); Eike Shutz,
Para Festejar el Dia Actualmente Son Desaslojadas Miles de Familias en Santo Domingo, MEDIO
AMIENTE Y URBANIZACION. Dec. 1998, at 79 (19.000 households).
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which is half a mile long, ten stories high, and projects a beam that can be
seen from 150 miles away in Puerto Rico, as "pharaonic. " 118 The electricity
required to power the lighthouse diverted energy from the surrounding
city for up to four hours at a time.119 Construction of the lighthouse
involved the leveling of slums and the erection of a four-mile long wall,
dubbed by locals "the wall of shame," to block adjacent poor districts from
view. 120 It is estimated that the lighthouse project involved the eviction of
over 10,000 people to make room for the massive structure and several
surrounding acres of landscaped grounds.1 21 Protests surrounding the
gross excesses of the lighthouse prevented the Pope and other international
dignitaries from attending its dedication ceremony.l 22
Several institutional problems in Santo Domingo contributed to the
devastating effects of the 500th Anniversary celebrations on low-income
communities: displaced tenant families were not compensated for
improvements they had made on public land, there was no connection
between the displaced families and newly constructed units, and no
standards were adopted for relocation.l 23 Tenants in slums were
considered "second-class" citizens with fewer rights than homeowners. 124
Relocated homeowners received some compensation (albeit at an
inadequate level), while evicted tenants received nothing.a25 Although
there were legal provisions that protected tenants from unjustified and
uncompensated evictions, the government repeatedly violated these
provisions. 126
V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
In both Seoul and Santo Domingo, the hosting of mega-events had a
dramatically negative impact on low-income communities, particularly for
populations living in informal settlements. These case studies call into
question the efficacy of mega-events in reducing urban dualism and
improving urban infrastructure in an equitable manner. In order to identify
ways to improve mega-event implementation, it is first necessary to
examine, in more detail, the similarities between these two cases.
A. Rapid Urbanization and Shifting Economic Priorities
In both Seoul and Santo Domingo, the mega-events were promoted
118. What Price Columbus?, WASH. POST, Sept. 28,1992, at A16.
119. Rafferty, supra note 11, at XI.
120. Michael J. Rosenfeld, Goodbye Columbus: Dominicans and the "Wall of Shame,"
NATION, Feb. 24, 1992, at 217.
121. John Mitchell, In the Shadow of Columbus, WORLD & I, Feb. 1997, available at
http://www.worldandi.com/archive/lffeb97.htm.
122. See Douglas Farah, Curse of Columbus? President Misses Dominican Celebration, WASH.
POST, Oct. 7, 1992, at Al; Jimenez, supra note 11, at 2; What Price Columbus?, supra note 118.
123. See UNCESCR, supra note 112.
124. See HARDOY & SATTERTHWAITE, supra note 117, at 48.
125. Id.
126. See Morel & Mejia, supra note 12, at 105.
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within the context of rapid urbanization and the growing primacy of the
capital city in the nation's economy. As a result of these trends, the market
pressures on urban land were already intense in the host cities. In both
cities, the government initiated massive urban development projects prior
to the hosting of the event, and these projects were largely focused on
improving the attractiveness of the city for tourism and international
investment. Urban growth and the ensuing investment in construction
projects had already precipitated slum clearance programs to open up
urban land in the city center for more profitable uses.
However, in both cities the mega-events accelerated and changed the
nature of the eviction process. As numerous researchers have noted, mega-
events tend to place tremendous pressures on housing markets by
attracting an influx of visitors over a very short period of time.127 Time
pressure was often cited as the rationale for excessively violent or
disruptive eviction programs and disregard for even minimal tenant
protections.128 And, although previous evictions occurred within the
context of widespread construction programs, aimed (at least ostensibly) at
improving the urban infrastructure, event-related evictions were often
disconnected from any clear long-term goals. The removal of housing in
Puchon along the Olympic torch in Seoul and the massive evictions to
build a largely symbolic lighthouse in Santo Domingo most dramatically
illustrate this point.
In the aftermath of these temporary mega-events, the lasting legacies in
both cities include an escalation in land and housing prices, greater
dependency of the local economies on tourism, and a more dispersed and
economically marginal squatter population. Perhaps most importantly, the
mega-events exacerbated, rather than alleviated, regional imbalances in the
host countries. According to Kang Hong Bin, a government official in
Seoul, "[ilmproved urban services, increased public amenities, [and]
accelerated real estate developments in Seoul" contributed "to the
widening disparity between Seoul and the regions, attracting even further
capital and people to the city." 129 Since 1988, South Korea has attempted to
alleviate the worsening problems of overpopulation in Seoul by
discouraging downtown construction under a national decentralization
policy.13 0 In Santo Domingo, the 500th Anniversary significantly increased
imbalances in the national economy and diverted attention away from
long-term solutions to poverty. The emphasis on tourism projects in Santo
Domingo has reinforced urban primacy and undermined the country's
attempts to redistribute economic growth through export manufacturing
zones outside the primary city.131
127. See, e.g., Mark Clifford, Too Many People Looking for Too Few Houses, FAR E. ECON.
REV., Sept. 8, 1988, at 84, 84-85; Olds, supra note 42, at 51; Ritchie & Hall, supra note 44, at 107-
09; Greene, supra note 42, at 3940.
128. See, e.g., Morel & Mejia, supra note 12, at 98.
129. Maass, supra note 11 (quoting Kang Hong Bin).
130. Yoo, supra note 18, at 59.
131. See Portes et al. supra nnt Q9 at 13.
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B. Increasing Disparities in Land and Housing Markets
In both Seoul and Santo Domingo, the removal of informal settlements
from center city areas in preparation for mega-events resulted in an overall
increase in high-cost, modern housing at the expense of low-cost, informal
housing. In its 1996 Global Report on Human Settlements, the United
Nations Centre for Human Settlements found that evictions often result in
the conversion of high-value urban land from urban poor who inhabit
settlements to middle- or upper-income groups. 132 The municipal
governments in both Seoul and Santo Domingo failed to recognize or
compensate the investments made by residents of informal settlements,
whose labor and capital helped "urbanize" large areas of these cities with
little or no government support. Instead, their efforts were sacrificed to
enable a government-led shift to development-based tourism.
Seoul's redevelopment strategy for the Olympics channeled substantial
profits to construction firms and increased housing opportunities for
middle- and upper-income populations but reduced housing opportunities
for low-income communities. 33 Spurred by the Olympics, the price of
apartments soared by 20.4% in the first eight months of 1988 and land
prices rose by 27% in 1988, the steepest rise since 1978.134 The effects of
Olympic-related development and the displacement that accompanied it
did not end with the completion of the Games. The Habitat International
Coalition estimates that as many as 1.5 million people, or 15% of Seoul's
population, faced dislocation after the Olympics as a result of
redevelopment. 35 Housing constructed for the Olympics, such as the
Olympic Family Town, was rented to Olympic officials and tourists for
$275 a night and then sold to middle- and upper-income buyers after the
Games."36 Units in the Olympic Village, which housed athletes during the
Games, were "exceedingly large by Korean standards.. .making the
apartments affordable only to the upper middle class, and possibly
attractive only to those customers with a distinctly Western outlook."137
Formalization of housing markets in Santo Domingo also resulted in
increased costs for tenants. Through the urban renewal programs in the
1980s, housing markets were "dollarized," putting them out of reach of
most wage earners.138 The price of urban land rose, and the landholding
structure tended to become more concentrated. 139 This situation was
exacerbated by lack of eviction protections and irregularities in
compensation for displaced families. 40 Despite the new units produced
132. See UNCHS GLOBAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 244.
133. See ACHR, supra note 12, at 90.
134. Yoo, supra note 18, at 59.
135. Bank, supra note 11.
136. See id.
137. Leslie Freudenheim, Olympic Housing in Seoul, PROGRESSIVE ARCHITECTURE, Oct.
1988, at 38, 38.
138. Morel & Mejia, supra note 12, at 86.
139. Id. at 92.
140. See id. at 86.
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under Balaguer's construction program, the loss of informal, affordable
units and the much higher rents in the rebuilt units made the program
"completely ineffective in overcoming the country's serious housing
shortage."' 41
C. Autocracy and Elitism in the Planning Process
Several researchers have commented on the elitism that tends to
pervade mega-event planning. Roche equated mega-event planning with
elite and often autocratic political structures.142 Similarly, Armstrong found
that eighteen of the twenty-three publicly funded mega-event projects in
his study "came about through the efforts and influence of individuals who
were powerful politicans."143 Relying on a logic of "trickle-down"
economics, "city leaders and event organizers typically claim that mega-
events help to address the economic and cultural needs and rights of local
citizens, regardless of whether the citizens have actually been consulted
about or involved in their production." 144
In both Seoul and Santo Domingo, the events were organized and
implemented almost entirely by urban elites, with very little public
participation. The scale of redevelopment in preparation for the Seoul
Olympics was driven to a great extent by large, powerful construction
firms. During the 1960s and 1970s, the scale of work undertaken by South
Korean construction companies working overseas grew rapidly,
particularly in the Middle East.145 By 1981, South Korean companies
represented the world's second largest contractor for international
construction projects. 146 With the collapse of the Middle East construction
boom in 1979, these construction companies sought secure projects in
South Korea. 147 The Olympics, and the massive redevelopment projects
that accompanied the Games, provided such an opportunity. Construction
companies lobbied the municipal government to implement the joint
development model,148 which privatized redevelopment and stimulated
massive conversion of informal settlements into middle-class
neighborhoods. 149 In fact, Chung Ju Yung, the president of the Seoul-based
Hyundai Construction, co-chaired the South Korean Olympic bid team
along with Seoul's Mayor Park Young Soo. Together, Chung and Park
lobbied hard among Third World delegates to the IOC, arguing, "the time
had arrived for a developing country to host the Olympics."' 50
141. Id. at 85.
142. See Roche, supra note 17, at 6.
143. J. Armstrong, International Events and Popular Myths, in INTERNATIONAL EVENTS: THE
REAL TOURISM IMPACT, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1985 CANADA CHAPTER CONFERENCE 7 (Travel
and Tourism Research Ass. ed., 1986), cited in Roche, supra note 17, at 6.
144. Roche, supra note 17, at 2.
145. ACHR, supra note 12, at 92-93.
146. Id.
147. Id; see also Kim, supra note 46, at 242.
148. Kim, supra note 46, at 242.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 71-78.
150. John McBeth. The Off-and-On_ lUn and Dmnn Sportb Success; FAR F.. FON REv .Snt A,
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While the Seoul municipal government took a rather active role in
promoting the Olympics, investing almost $3 billion in improvements, it
attempted to distance itself entirely from the slum clearance process.
Through the joint development program, the City shifted responsibility for
clearing land and relocating tenants to private construction companies. The
government was able to remove itself from blame for the evictions by
describing them as a private issue between tenants and construction
companieslSl The joint development program essentially privatized
housing markets in Seoul, and the municipal government largely stepped
back from the role of public planner.152 The government relied on market
ventures to "foster the perception of a modem city in a hurry."153 However,
as ACHR points out, the government, by not demanding that construction
companies make provisions for displaced tenants, created additional public
costs associated with the increased demand for welfare and services by
displaced populations.1 s 4
In Santo Domingo, urban development projects associated with the
500th Anniversary were carried out under the direct supervision of
President Balaguer's office. It is estimated that 92.1% of the public works
projects were funded through the President's office in the period of the
most intense evictions, 1987 to 1989.155 The state subcontracted to private
construction firms, which made summary valuations of properties, decided
which areas where to be demolished, assigned and distributed housing,
and were able to call in police and military force to remove residents
illegally occupying the land.156 This system allowed developers to ignore
formal channels, and corruption was rampant. 157
Business elites in Santo Domingo were extremely optimistic about the
effect of the Columbus Day celebrations on the city. The tourist industry, in
particular, anticipated a dramatic increase in the volume of visitors as a
result of the event. 158 The lighthouse project was conceived by Balaguer
and driven by a national elite attempting to demonstrate its European
Catholic culture.159 Balaguer himself has been described as the "very
embodiment of the cultural pretensions and prejudices of the Dominican
elite," having published a book deploring the country's "ethnic decline"
1988, at 59, 59.
151. See ACHR, supra note 12, at 93.
152. See Kim, supra note 46, at 249.
153. Id.
154. See ACHR, supra note 12, at 93.
155. Morel & Mejia, supra note 12, at 106.
156. See id. at 99, 107, 109.
157. See id. at 109.
158. Canute James, Columbus Fever Runs High, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1992, at 35; see also
MARIA ELENA PORTORREAL DE ALONSO, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INT'L TRADE
ADMINISTRATION, FOREIGN COMMERCIAL SERVICE, TOURISM IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC,
August 1992, LEXIS Country Reports, Dominican Republic ("Tourism growth predictions for
119921 are very favorable, the expectations are that the celebration of the 500th Anniversary of
the Discovery of America will benefit an industry of great importance to the economy.").
159. See Harding, supra note 11, at 12.
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due to excessive immigration from Haiti. 160 The lighthouse project was the
centerpiece of his attempts to sell the country to U.S. and European tourists
and investors as a "a politically stable, economically promising paradise,
'the land Columbus loved best."' 161
Balaguer's excessive spending on massive public works, despite
widespread poverty, undermined his administration's legitimacy. 162
Balaguer returned to the presidency in 1986 after several years of exile and
failed re-election campaigns. By 1989, he had already spent $600 million on
public works.163 However, as Balaguer pushed an agenda of monumental
public works, basic services collapsed throughout the country.164 His
leadership has been associated with a "cult of monumentality," 165 and
many Dominicans believe that Balaguer, at 81 years old, only ran for
president again in 1990 so that he could oversee the lighthouse
celebrations. 166
According to Morel and Mejia, slum clearance projects in Santo
Domingo were "highly conditioned by the authoritarian style with which
they were conducted, the centralization of decision-making, and the
weakness of the country's social institutions." 167 The state acted as an
external, disruptive force, failing to pay attention to neighborhoods slated
for renewal except to intervene as an agent of repression.168
D. Disruption of Social Networks and Informal Economies
The massive evictions that occurred both in Seoul and Santo Domingo
prior to mega-events disrupted informal housing markets that had
developed in response to the decades of in-migration and population
growth in each city that outpaced housing production in the formal sector.
Studies of both cities have described the displaced settlements as largely
functional and stable communities prior to the evictions. For example, Kim
notes the strong social ties that had developed in displaced communities in
Seoul' 69 and Morel and Mejia found that the conditions in the original
settlements in Santo Domingo were largely satisfactory, with a prevailing
sense of "belonging" and "community" that was lost after relocation. 7 0
In Seoul, the redevelopment of SHR districts in the 1980s radically
transformed the physical structure of the city. Fine-grained low-income
communities were razed and replaced with high-rise developments,
largely disconnected from each other and the surrounding community. 171
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See White, supra note 11.
163. Treaster, supra note 11.
164. See id.
165. Morel & Mejia, supra note 12, at 87.
166. Harding, supra note 11, at 12.
167. Morel & Mejia, supra note 12, at 140.
168. Id. at 86-87.
169. See Kim, supra note 46, at 246.
170. Morel & Mejia, supra note 12, at 86.
171. See Kim, supra note 46, at 243.
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Evictions destroyed not only the physical environment, but also the social
ties and support networks which had developed among residents. Despite
its euphemistic title, the "joint development program" actually eroded
relationships within communities, pitting property owners, tenants, and
construction firms against each other for pecuniary advantages.172
Similarly, slum clearance projects in Santo Domingo fractured
community identity by dismantling mechanisms for mutual support
among displaced populations.173 Low-income groups were forced to live
farther and farther away from their places of work, and there was a loss of
connection to sources of income, particularly in informal or "underground"
economies. 74 In its relocation decisions, the government also failed to
recognize the critical role of street vending in the barrio economy in Santo
Domingo. Once removed to sparsely populated zones or areas where most
people had very low incomes, street vendors lost their source of
livelihood.175 Similarly, those residents who were lucky enough to be
relocated into high-rise housing constructed by the government were
unable to operate the small, home-based businesses they had previously
relied upon in single-level housing. The environment in these large
housing complexes was not conducive to the creation of informal support
networks.176
Despite the breakdown of community networks as a result of
displacement in Seoul and Santo Domingo, low-income communities
became more politically organized prior to the mega-events as tenants
mobilized to resist displacement. In Seoul, the Olympics helped
consolidate an international housing rights movement in Asia, and added
legitimacy and exposure to the newly formed Asian Coalition for Housing
Rights. 177 In Santo Domingo, barrio dwellers organized powerful coalitions
with churches, city planners, and international human rights groups to
demand changes in Balaguer's slum clearance programs. Almost
immediately after the plans for redeveloping the capital for the 500th
Anniversary were drawn up, barrio residents organized to fight
displacement. As early as 1986, the Comit6 Para la Defensa de los Derechos
Bariales (COPADEBA, or the Committee for the Defense of Barrio Rights)
was organizing residents of impacted neighborhoods. 178 In 1987 they
launched a campaign to bring international attention to the problem of
barrio rights in Santo Domingo. 179 Under the auspices of COPADEBA,
protestors in Santo Domingo offered a more humane plan, called the
172. See id. at 24647.
173. Morel & Mejia, supra note 12, at 88.
174. See id. at 86.
175. See id. at 138.
176. See id. at 139.
177. See ACHR, NGO Profile, supra note 63, at 155; see also Kim, supra note 12, at 223-231
(describing the role that the Olympics played in mobilizing communities in Seoul to demand
official recognition of housing rights).
178. See Morel & Mejia, supra note 12, at 96.
179. See id. at 96-97.
2003]
23
Greene: Staged Cities: Mega-events, Slum Clearance, and Global Capital
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2003
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
"Alternative City," to address the problems of urban slums.' 80 Elements of
their proposal were eventually incorporated, although in very limited
ways, into official policy.' 8' COPADEBA, with the support of international
NGO's, succeeded in establishing assessment -standards, basic tenant
rights, and guarantees that residents would be informed prior to
eviction. 18 2 However, as Morel and Mejia note, "to the extent that victims
won compensation.. .this was more a result of their capacity to offer
resistance and opposition, negotiate, and propose alternatives.. .than of any
state planning or intent." 1
83
E. Undermining Rule of Law Claims
In both Seoul and Santo Domingo, mega-events were initiated with an
eye to promoting the country's participation in the global economy
through legal reform and the strengthening of rule of law institutions. Soon
after its successful bid, the Korean government launched the Civilian
Olympic Preparation Committee, a nation-wide civilian organization, to
promote awareness and respect for law and order. 8 4 The goal of the
civilian campaign was to "to show the world that Korea had developed
economically, as well as socially and culturally" and to demonstrate that
Korea could "live up to the social norms of the developed nations."' 85
However, according to Chan Jin Kim, a former member of the Korean
National Assembly, the mission of the civilian campaign was soon
undermined by the government' s emphasis on "superficial things that
would make Korea look good to the rest of the world. " 1
86
In the years preceding the 500th Anniversary, the Dominican Republic
became the subject of international criticism for human rights violations. In
1991, the U.S. State Department published a report condemning human
rights abuses in the Dominican Republic, particularly the treatment of
Haitians working in the sugarcane industry.' 87 The U.S. Congress
considered withholding $200 million in aid to the Dominican Republic to
protest the abuses.' 88 In addition, Balaguer's presidency had been riddled
180. See id. at 97-98, 117; U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 25,
Forced Evictions and Human Rights, May 1996, at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/
2/fs25.htm.
181. See UNCESCR, supra note 111; Morel & Mejia, supra note 12, at 102.
182. See Morel & Mejia, supra note 12, at 142.
183. Id. at 140.
184. Kim, supra note 37, at 34.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS & SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 102d
CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1991, at 572-81 (Joint Comm.
Print 1992); see also Stephen Fidler, Dominican Republic; Apres Moi, Le Deluge, FIN. TIMES, Feb.
27, 1992, at 33.
188. Greg Chamberlain, Haiti Protests as Workers Expelled, GUARDIAN (LONDON), June 26,
1991; see also LAWYER'S COMMITrEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, A CHILDHOOD ABDUCTED: CHILDREN
CUTTING SUGAR CANE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 77-80 (1991) (describing how the United
States Trade Representative nearly revoked the Dominican Republic's trade preference status
under the General System of Preferences and the Carihhean Basin Initiativp h catl s it was
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with allegations of fraud and corruption, hampering the country's ability to
attract foreign investment. 1
89
Although the 500th Anniversary celebration was primarily geared
towards monumental public works and tourism promotion, observers have
noted that the Balaguer administration also hoped to use the event to
neutralize the Dominican Republic's reputation of past human rights
abuses and impress upon foreign investors that the national economy was
"in good health."' 9 In the two years prior to 500th Anniversary, the
Dominican Republic caught up on payments to the World Bank and Inter-
American Development Bank and entered into new loan agreements with
the IMF, clearing the way for negotiations with creditor governments over
debt restructuring. 9' At the inauguration ceremony for the Columbus
lighthouse, Balaguer had hoped to host an impressive array of foreign
dignitaries, including Pope John Paul 1I, the king and queen of Spain, and
numerous heads of state who would be willing to endorse the Dominican
Republic's progress. However, as a result of the bad publicity generated by
the slum clearance efforts and international criticism of the excesses of the
monumental lighthouse, most invited speakers canceled or rescheduled
their appearances.19 2 Joao Baena Soares, then Secretary General of the
Organization of American States, was the sole visiting dignitary to attend
the inauguration, and he used to opportunity to denounce human rights
abuses in the Americas.
93
As these examples illustrate, urban and national policymakers eager to
ensure foreign investor confidence do not necessarily see slum clearance
and rule of law ambitions in opposition to each other.194 However, the
efficacy of mega-events in promoting investor confidence is highly
questionable when coupled with slum clearance due to the negative
publicity mass evictions generate and the social instability caused by
population displacement. 195 In both Seoul and Santo Domingo, attempts to
remove slums from the view of international visitors and the media
alleged that the country was not adhering to basic international standards of worker rights);
AMERICAS WATCH, NATIONAL COALITION FOR HAITIAN REFUGEES, A TROUBLED YEAR:
HAITIANS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 5 (1992) (criticizing the failure of the United States to
use its influence as the Dominican Republic's largest trading partner to protect the human
rights of Haitian workers).
189. See PRS Group, Climate for Business, POLITICAL RISK SERVICES, Nov. 1, 1996, LEXIS
Country Reports, Dominican Republic.
190. See, e.g., Fidler, supra note 187, at 33; Susan Hayward, Can Celebration Rescue the
Dominican Economy?, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 27, 1988, at A30; Wilenz, supra note 11, at 704
191. Id.
192. See Farah, supra note 122.
193. Jimenez, supra note 122, at 2.
194. As a more recent example outside the context of mega-events, the South African
government recently conducted widespread evictions of squatters from publicly owned land.
In the wake of land seizures by landless peasants in Zimbabwe, the Afriqan National Congress
cited the need to "show the world that it respects the rule of law and property rights-and to
convince foreign companies that it is safe to invest in South Africa," as justification for the
evictions. Jon Jeter, South Africa Flattens Squatters Homes, WASH. POST, July 13, 2001, at Al.
195. For a general discussion of the human and economic costs of forced evictions, see
LECKIE, supra note 7, at 29-30.
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backfired, undermining the host countries' human rights reputations.
International agencies, such as the United Nations Centre for Human
Settlements (UNCHS) and the United Nations Committee on Economic
Social, and Cultural Rights (UNCESCR) condemned both countries for
evicting slum dwellers in preparation for the events as violations of
international covenants and domestic law.196 International press coverage
of both events was highly critical of the evictions. For example, articles
with headlines like "What Price Columbus?," 197 "Rocky Course for
Lighthouse in Eye of Storm,"198 and "A Gloomy Monument to
Columbus"1 99 far outnumbered positive coverage of Santo Domingo's
500th Anniversary celebration. 200 In such an environment, investor
confidence and acceptance among the international legal community was
likely diminished, rather than improved.
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In both Seoul and Santo Domingo, local governments were willing to
invest several million dollars of public money in mega-events in order to
demonstrate their city's ability to compete in an increasingly global
marketplace. According to the logic of mega-events, by successfully
hosting a world-class event and showcasing the city's modern
infrastructure and amenities to a global audience, the host city would
recoup its expenses in renewed tourism and international investment.
Much of the research on mega-events reinforces this view by focusing on
the economic costs and benefits of mega-events for the host city or the
event sponsors while largely ignoring the social and spatial consequences
of the events for low-income communities. As the case studies described in
this Note indicate, poor neighborhoods and squatter communities did not
enjoy the benefits of the international celebrations in Seoul and Santo
Domingo. Rather, the urban poor were systematically removed or
concealed from high-profile areas in order to construct the appearance of
development.
Slum clearance in preparation for mega-events is shortsighted and
ultimately regressive urban policy. Not only do slum clearance programs
destroy the tremendous amount of human labor and household
investments in "urbanizing" land through informal settlements, but they
also undermine the host city's ability to project a positive image. Host cities
and international organizations participating in mega-events should look
at these events as opportunities to improve the physical conditions of
informal and low-income settlements by adopting more equitable urban
policies.
196. See UNCESCR, supra note 111. For an overview of international human rights law
governing evictions, see LECKIE, supra note 7, at 33-60.
197. Mhat Price Columbus?, supra note 118.
198. Harding, supra note 11.
199. Rafferty, supra note 11.
200. For examples of negative media coverage of Seoul's slum clearance efforts prior to
the Games, see Bank, supra note 11; Leyden, supra note 11; Maass, supra note 11.
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At an international level, organizations sponsoring or participating in
mega-events -such as the International Olympic Committee, Asian Games,
World Bank, and World Tourism Council-should establish human rights
standards to govern venue selection. 201 Sponsors should develop a host
city "score card" to evaluate the sufficiency of domestic legal protections,
such as fair labor laws and basic tenant rights and take an inventory of
existing urban infrastructure to ensure that preparations will not abruptly
alter housing markets or force rapid physical changes that are not
amenable to community participation. Host cities should not only be
monitored to ensure protection of basic human rights, but resources should
also be provided to municipal governments, as well as community-based
organizations, to adopt long-term solutions to problems facing the host
city. Any redevelopment in preparation for the event should guarantee
adequate relocation compensation for all residents, not just homeowners,
displaced in the process. Venues constructed for mega-events should be
distributed throughout the host country or region to distribute investment
and encourage more balanced regional growth.
At the host city level, linkage programs should be implemented so that
profits generated by the events are brought back into low-income
communities. For instance, a portion of attendance fees or sponsorships
could be dedicated to local community development projects. Creative
mechanisms to integrate event-related development into the urban social
fabric should be adopted, such as enabling street vendors and family-run
businesses to play a role in tourist enterprises.
Finally, the process of bidding for, planning for, and implementing
mega-events must be democratized. Perhaps the most significant factor in
determining the extent of displacement caused by mega-events is the
presence or lack of community participation in event planning. In both the
cases discussed here, autocratic decision-making and shortsightedness
defined the event planning process. Host cities should capitalize on the
civic-mindedness inspired by mega-events to institute new mechanisms for
neighborhood-based planning. The mega-event should not dictate physical
planning but rather respond to the clearly articulated needs of the host city
and comply with a broader strategic plan. Without these measures in place,
the short-term mega-event will inevitably compromise the long-term urban
development strategy.
201. Although the IOC screens prospective host cities through an elaborate, multi-stage
evaluation process, it does not formally inquire into the human rights record of bidding
nations. See Mastrocola, supra note 36, at 145-46. As a former American representative of the
1OC explained, "the truth is, if we begin to exclude cities solely because of complaints about
human rights violations, there would be few countries where the Games could be held-
including the United States." Id. (quoting Anita DeFrantz).
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